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IS FULL MARRIAGE EQUALITY FOR SAME-
SEX COUPLES NEXT?  THE IMMEDIATE AND 
FUTURE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR 
Catherine Jean Archibald* 
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1 
“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”2 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As people across the political spectrum sat on the edge of their seats 
last summer, the Supreme Court waited until the last possible moment to 
                                                 
* Catherine Jean Archibald is a graduate of Michigan State University College of Law 
and the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, where she earned her J.D. and LL.B. degrees, 
respectively, with concentrations in International and Environmental Law.  She holds a 
bachelor’s degree in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology from Princeton University.  Most 
recently, she worked as an associate at the international law firm of Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP 
in New York City, until shortly before its bankruptcy in 2012.  She can be reached at 
archibld@alumni.princeton.edu.  The author would like to thank Elissa Levy for her help 
during the writing process. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
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issue its two same-sex marriage decisions.3  One, decided on a 
technicality, did nothing to answer the question of whether same-sex 
couples have a constitutional right to marry; though, it did result in the 
return of same-sex marriage to California, the most populous state in the 
nation.4  The other, a landmark decision, struck down Section 3 of the 
Federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) and held that same-sex 
couples validly married under state law must have their marriages 
recognized by federal law.5  This sweeping decision, United States v. 
Windsor,6 issued on June 26, 2013, changed the effect of over 1000 federal 
statutes7 and impacted the lives of tens of thousands of same-sex couples 
and their children across the country.8 
However, the Windsor opinion is limited to “those [in] lawful 
marriages,”9 and accordingly has no immediate effect on the laws of the 
more than thirty states where same-sex marriage is still prohibited.10  
Thus, its impact on future cases challenging state same-sex marriage 
prohibitions remains to be seen, although a growing number of courts 
have already relied on Windsor to find that various state same-sex 
marriage prohibitions are invalid.11  Additionally, the basis of the 
                                                 
3 The Supreme Court issued both same-sex marriage decisions on June 26, 2013, the last 
day of its 2012–2013 session.  Jess Bravin, Historic Win for Gay Marriage:  High Court Rulings 
Lift Bans on Federal Same-Sex Benefits, Weddings in California, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2013, 8:37 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873245209045785535000287714 
88; Supreme Court Calendar, October Term 2012, http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/2012TermCourtCalendar.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2014). 
4 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (holding that the petitioners 
did not have standing; therefore, the Court did not have authority to decide the case on the 
merits and the district court’s decision requiring the return of same-sex marriage to 
California stands); Tony Agurto, Governor Brown Directs California Department of Public 
Health to Notify Counties that Same-Sex Marriages Must Commence, CA.GOV (June 28, 2013), 
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18120 (noting that California’s governor directed that 
marriage licenses be issued to same-sex couples in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry). 
5 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
6 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
7 See id. at 2683 (“[DOMA’s] definition of marriage for purposes of all federal statutes 
and other regulations or directives covered by its terms . . . does control over 1,000 federal 
laws in which marital or spousal status is addressed as a matter of federal law.”). 
8 See id. at 2694 (describing DOMA’s negative effect on same-sex couples and their 
children). 
9 Id. at 2696. 
10 See Marriage Recognition, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/ 
marriage-center (last visited Aug. 17, 2014) (showing that thirty-one states still prohibit 
same-sex marriage); see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689 (noting that, as of its holding, twelve 
states and the District of Columbia recognized and permitted same-sex marriage). 
11 See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-1169, 14-1173, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14298 
(4th Cir. July 28, 2014) (relying on Windsor and finding Virginia's ban on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, and not staying implementation of 
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opinion is not immediately obvious, as it contains elements of 
federalism, due process, and equal protection.12  However, by 
extensively discussing the traditional state power over marriage,13 and 
by describing New York’s decision to extend marriage to same-sex 
couples as advancing the cause of equality,14 the decision indicates to 
other states that they should likewise eliminate restrictions on same-sex 
marriage.  If they do not, a close examination of the logic and reasoning 
of Windsor leads to the conclusion that future state and federal courts are 
likely to find that state same-sex marriage prohibitions are 
unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                             





v. United States ex rel. Holder, Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13733 (10th 
Cir. July 18, 2014) (relying on Windsor and upholding district court's finding of 
unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's same-sex marriage ban, but staying implementation of 
the decision until any appeal to the Supreme Court is decided), aff’g 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 
(N.D. Okla. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-4178, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935 (10th Cir. 
June 25, 2014) (relying on Windsor and upholding district court's finding of 
unconstitutionality of Utah's same-sex marriage ban, but staying implementation of the 
decision until any appeal to the Supreme Court is decided), aff’g 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. 
Utah 2013); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, Nos. 6:13-cv-01834-MC, 6:13-cv-02256-MC, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 68171 (D. Or. May 19, 2014) (relying on Windsor and striking down Oregon's same-
sex marriage prohibitions as violations of the United States Constitution); Whitewood v. 
Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D. Pa. 2014) (relying on Windsor and striking down 
Pennsylvania's same-sex marriage prohibitions as violations of the United States 
Constitution); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1038–39 (N.J. 2013) (affirming the 
decision of the lower court that found New Jersey must allow same-sex marriage in light of 
the Windsor decision); see also Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973, 979–82, 984, 
992, 995–96 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (relying on the reasoning in Windsor and finding that Ohio 
must recognize same-sex marriages performed outside the state); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-
8719, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173801, at *1–2, *7–9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013) (relying on Windsor 
and finding that same-sex couples in Illinois with terminal illnesses must be allowed to 
marry even before the Illinois marriage equality law comes into force because “[t]he 
putative subclass of medically critical plaintiffs here are likely to succeed on the merits of 
their claim that the provisions of the current Illinois law that deny them the right to marry 
based solely on their sexual orientation, as applied, violates their constitutional right to 
equal protection”); Deboer v. Snyder, No. 12-cv-10285, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98382, at *2, 
*5–7 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2013) (denying a motion to dismiss in a case challenging Michigan’s 
same-sex marriage ban because after Windsor, plaintiffs’ claims have “plausibility”). 
12 See infra Part III (breaking the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor into five separate 
considerations). 
13 See infra Part III.B (discussing the role federalism played in the Supreme Court’s 
decision). 
14 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (“When New York adopted a law to permit same-sex 
marriage, it sought to eliminate inequality . . . .”). 
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Justice Ginsburg—one of the Justices signing on to the majority 
opinion in Windsor—has written that effective judicial decisions should 
“strive[] to persuade.”15  Furthermore, she wrote that “without taking 
giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful to contain, the 
[Supreme] Court, through constitutional adjudication, can reinforce or 
signal a green light for a social change.”16  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Windsor adheres to these ideals. 
Part II of this Article describes the background to the Windsor case 
and its rise to the Supreme Court.17  Part III analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Windsor, and the elements of federalism, due process, 
and equal protection present in the opinion.18  Part IV of this Article 
applies the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor to future same-sex 
marriage cases involving challenges to state same-sex marriage 
prohibitions; it concludes that the Windsor decision should lead to courts 
finding that state prohibitions on same-sex marriage are 
unconstitutional, as has already begun to happen.19 
II.  WINDSOR’S JOURNEY TO THE SUPREME COURT 
The Windsor case began when plaintiff Edith Windsor was assessed, 
and paid, more than $350,000 in federal income taxes that she would not 
have had to pay if her deceased spouse had been male instead of 
female.20  Windsor sued in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, challenging Section 3 of DOMA,21 which 
provided that: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or 
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.22 
                                                 
15 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1992). 
16 Id. at 1208. 
17 See infra Part II (setting forth background information to the Windsor decision). 
18 See infra Part III (analyzing the Windsor opinion). 
19 See infra Part IV (describing how the decision in Windsor will affect future decisions of 
state and federal courts); see also supra note 11 (listing a number of court cases that have 
already found state same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional in light of Windsor). 
20 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
21 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
22 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
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Windsor was validly married under New York state law, where she 
and her wife had resided at the time of her wife’s death.23  Windsor 
alleged that DOMA violated the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection, applicable to the federal government through the Fifth 
Amendment, because it discriminated against her on the basis of sexual 
orientation.24 
The district court ruled for Windsor, found DOMA unconstitutional, 
and ordered that the federal government refund Windsor the tax money 
she had paid.25  The district court found that DOMA discriminated based 
on sexual orientation and that DOMA was not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.26  In making its determination, the court 
noted that it must perform a more thorough review under the rational 
basis test for laws that show “a desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.”27  The district court declined to decide whether sexual 
orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny, as it 
found that the law could not even meet the more lenient rational basis 
test.28 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, 
but on slightly different grounds.29  The Second Circuit found that sexual 
orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened scrutiny and 
that DOMA could not pass heightened scrutiny.30  The Second Circuit 
found it unnecessary to decide whether DOMA could pass rational basis 
review, as it found heightened scrutiny applied and DOMA could not 
meet such scrutiny.31 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s 
opinion, finding that DOMA violated the constitutional equal protection 
                                                 
23 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
24 Complaint at 3, 21, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 
10 Civ. 8435 (BSJ)), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-11-9-WindsorvUS-
Complaint.pdf. 
25 Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
26 Id. at 402. 
27 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
28 Id. at 401–02; see infra text accompanying notes 94–99 (describing the different levels of 
scrutiny used by courts performing equal protection review). 
29 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming the 
district court’s decision after applying heightened scrutiny to Windsor’s claim). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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guarantee.32  However, the Court, like the district court, used rational 
basis review to reach this conclusion.33  The Supreme Court also found 
that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.34  In the beginning of its opinion, the 
Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of federalism,35 perhaps to 
obscure the logical conclusion that just as the federal same-sex marriage 
exclusion is unconstitutional, so too are the state same-sex marriage 
exclusions still present in most state law.  The extensive discussion 
regarding state control over marriage also serves to encourage states that 
still prohibit same-sex marriage to change their laws.36 
A. The Tone of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
The tone of the Windsor opinion is persuasive, not combative.  The 
Court seemed acutely aware that many people would be upset by, and 
disagree with, its decision.  Thus, the Court bent over backwards to 
                                                 
32 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013); see infra Part III.E (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis). 
33 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate 
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, 
by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”); see also supra text 
accompanying note 95 (explaining rational basis scrutiny). 
34 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; see infra Part III.D (explaining that, although the Court did 
not identify the specific liberty interest at stake, prior cases suggest the Court likely found 
that DOMA infringed upon the fundamental right to marry). 
35 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–92; see infra Part III.B (discussing in depth the Court’s 
federalism analysis). 
36 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the Court’s persuasive tone in the Windsor opinion).  In 
fact, in the slightly more than one year since the Windsor decision, same-sex marriage has 
been legalized in seven additional states, through court decisions, executive directives, or 
legislation.  See, e.g., Geiger v. Kitzhaber, Nos. 6:13-cv-01834-MC, 6:13-cv-02256-MC, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68171 (D. Or. May 19, 2014) (striking down Oregon's same-sex marriage 
prohibitions); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D. Pa. 2014) (striking down 
Pennsylvania's same-sex marriage prohibitions); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (finding invalid New Jersey’s same-sex marriage ban in 
light of Windsor), aff’d, 79 A.3d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 
(N.M. 2013) (finding that same-sex couples have the right to marry under the New Mexico 
Constitution); see also Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 80/1–997 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-626 of the 2013 Reg. Sess.) (legalizing 
same-sex marriage in Illinois); Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013, S.B. 1, 27th Leg., 2013 
2d Spec. Sess. (Haw. 2013) (legalizing same-sex marriage in Hawaii because Hawaii’s civil 
unions cannot provide the same benefits as marriage in light of Windsor); The Associated 
Press, Hawaii:  Same-Sex Marriage Becomes Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013, at A24, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/hawaii-same-sex-marriage-becomes-law.html? 
_r=0 (noting Hawaii’s decision to legalize same-sex marriage); Agurto, supra note 4 
(explaining the effects of California’s law legalizing same-sex marriage); supra note 11 and 
accompanying text (citing cases that have found same-sex marriage prohibitions invalid in 
light of Windsor). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss3/7
2014]   Is Full Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples Next? 701 
show that it understood the sincere belief of those who believe marriage 
should only be between a man and a woman.  It noted that “marriage 
between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most 
people as essential to the very definition of that term and to its role and 
function throughout the history of civilization.”37 
The Court then used gentle persuasive language to explain why this 
old view is incorrect:  “For others, however, came the beginnings of a 
new perspective, a new insight. . . . The limitation of lawful marriage to 
heterosexual couples . . . came to be seen in New York and certain other 
States as an unjust exclusion.”38  By using positive language to describe 
New York’s decision to extend marriage to same-sex couples, the Court 
indirectly praised those states that have decided to permit same-sex 
marriage.  The Court noted that when New York “used its historic and 
essential authority to define the marital relation[ship]” to include same-
sex couples, its “decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and 
protection of [same-sex couples] in their own community.”39 
The Court explained that New York, by extending marriage to same-
sex couples, deemed their relationships “worthy of dignity in the 
community equal with all other marriages.”40  This act “reflects both the 
community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the 
institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of 
equality.”41  Furthermore, “[w]hen New York adopted a law to permit 
same-sex marriage, it sought to eliminate inequality.”42 
The Court’s intent in writing this type of description was most likely 
to encourage more states to join the twelve states and the District of 
Columbia that had already extended marriage rights to same-sex couples 
at the time Windsor was written.43  If states voluntarily join New York in 
its quest to “eliminate inequality,”44 the Supreme Court will not have to 
force them to do so at a later date.45  Even if not all states change their 
laws to permit same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court likely hoped that 
                                                 
37 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 2692. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 2692–93. 
42 Id. at 2694. 
43 See id. at 2689 (noting that, as of its writing, twelve states and the District of Columbia 
recognized and permitted same-sex marriage).  Since Windsor was issued, same-sex 
marriage has been legalized in seven more states.  See supra note 36 (showing that 
California, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have 
legalized same-sex marriage). 
44 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
45 See infra Part IV.A (explaining that if states do not voluntarily follow in New York’s 
steps, the Supreme Court may force them to do so). 
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its opinion in Windsor would help turn the minority of states now 
permitting same-sex marriage into a majority.  Then, when it does come 
time for the Supreme Court to pronounce that all states must allow 
same-sex marriage, the risk of great public outrage will be reduced, as 
the Court will not be overturning the law of most states.46 
B. Federalism in the Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Court spent several pages describing how by history and 
tradition, marriage has been largely regulated by the states.47  For 
example, the Court noted that “at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, [the states] possessed full power over the subject of 
marriage and divorce . . . [and] the Constitution delegated no authority 
to the Government of the United States on the subject of marriage and 
divorce.”48  The Court recognized that in limited instances, such as 
determining what is a valid marriage for the purposes of immigration 
rights and determining who receives life insurance benefits under a 
federal program, the federal government may make laws that impact 
marriage.49  However, the Court noted that whereas Congress may make 
these limited laws to further discrete federal policy concerning federal 
programs, DOMA’s impact was much more far reaching than any other 
marriage-impacting Congressional act upheld by the Court.50 
Thus, upon a first reading of the Court’s opinion, one may have been 
fooled into thinking that the Court was going to decide that the federal 
government, in enacting DOMA, had overstepped the constitutional 
division of power between federal and state governments.51  This guess 
would have been bolstered by the fact that partway through its 
discussion on the extensive and traditional state power over marriage, 
the Court stated:  “In order to assess the validity of [DOMA’s] 
intervention it is necessary to discuss the extent of the state power and 
authority over marriage as a matter of history and tradition.”52  
However, at the end of the Court’s lengthy discussion on the traditional 
state power over marriage, the Court decided not to decide whether 
DOMA was unconstitutional as a violation of the balance of power 
                                                 
46 See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199 (noting that Supreme Court decisions that get too 
far ahead of public opinion risk a backlash against the judiciary). 
47 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–92. 
48 Id. at 2691 (quoting Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 575 (1906)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
49 Id. at 2690. 
50 Id. 
51 See id. (noting that DOMA has a very broad reach that affects a class of people that 
certain states enacted legislation to protect). 
52 Id. at 2691. 
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between federal and state governments, declaring:  “[I]t is unnecessary 
to decide whether this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of 
the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance.”53 
Instead, the Court concluded that DOMA, by “depart[ing] from th[e] 
history and tradition of reliance on state law to define marriage,” sets off 
alarm bells because “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially 
suggest careful consideration to determine whether they are obnoxious 
to the constitutional provision.”54  The Court quoted Romer v. Evans, an 
equal protection case, for this proposition.55  Thus, as discussed further 
below, the Court’s lengthy discussion of federalism and the states’ 
powers over marriage served simply to bolster its legal conclusion that 
DOMA violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment.56 
However, as mentioned above,57 the lengthy discussion on 
federalism may have been included by the Court for three other 
purposes:  (1) to persuade the majority of states that still prohibit same-
sex marriage that they should use their historic power to change their 
laws and join New York in “eliminat[ing] inequality;”58 (2) to obscure the 
fact that the Court’s reasoning necessarily leads to the conclusion that 
state same-sex marriage prohibitions are also unconstitutional; and (3) to 
provide a basis for courts to distinguish Windsor when faced with future 
challenges to state same-sex marriage prohibitions.59 
C. The Supreme Court’s Findings on DOMA’s Purpose and Effect 
After its extensive discussion on the federal division of power over 
marriage, the Court turned its attention to the purpose and effect of 
                                                 
53 Id. at 2692. 
54 Id.  (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
55 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24, 635 (finding unconstitutional as a violation of equal 
protection a Colorado constitutional amendment forbidding any local law from protecting 
against sexual orientation discrimination because the law was not rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest). 
56 See infra Part III.E (discussing the Supreme Court’s findings on equal protection in 
relation to DOMA). 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 35–36 (providing ideas as to why the Court 
discussed federalism at such length in Windsor); see also infra Part IV (analyzing the likely 
impact of Windsor on future cases). 
58 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694; see supra Part III.A. (discussing how the Court’s positive 
and persuasive tone in Windsor was likely meant to encourage other states to extend 
marriage rights to same-sex couples). 
59 See infra Part IV.B (noting ways in which courts might distinguish Windsor in future 
challenges). 
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DOMA.60  Examining the history and the text of DOMA, the Court found 
that it was passed in order to “impose restrictions and disabilities,”61 “to 
injure,”62 to promote “traditional moral teachings,”63 “to discourage 
enactment of state same-sex marriage laws,”64 and to treat same-sex 
marriages recognized under state law “as second-class marriages for 
purposes of federal law.”65 
The Court found the effects of DOMA were both financial and 
emotional.  Among other things, DOMA prevented same-sex married 
couples and their families from obtaining healthcare and other benefits 
they would otherwise receive, and forced them to undergo a complicated 
procedure for filing taxes.66  In addition, “DOMA instructs all federal 
officials, and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact, 
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than the 
marriages of others.”67  DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of children 
now being raised by same-sex couples” and makes it “difficult for the 
children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family 
and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily 
lives.”68 
D. The Supreme Court’s Findings on Due Process 
After discussing the purpose and effect of DOMA, the Court 
concluded that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because “the principal purpose 
and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are 
in a lawful same-sex marriage.”69  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment provides that:  “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”70  The Windsor Court 
did not discuss the reasoning behind its due process conclusion.  
However, an examination of the Court’s prior due process cases reveals 
that the Windsor Court likely reasoned that DOMA impermissibly 
infringed upon the right to marry.  In prior cases, the right to marry has 
                                                 
60 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–95. 
61 Id. at 2692. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 2693. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 2693–94. 
66 Id. at 2694. 
67 Id. at 2696. 
68 Id. at 2694. 
69 Id. at 2695. 
70 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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been found to be a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause.71 
Under the substantive liberty protection afforded by the Due Process 
Clause,72 before the government is permitted to infringe upon a 
fundamental liberty interest, it must demonstrate a compelling reason to 
do so.73  Fundamental liberty rights have been described as those rights 
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” “so rooted 
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”74 
However, the Supreme Court recently held that “[h]istory and 
tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the 
substantive due process inquiry.”75  In Lawrence v. Texas,76 the Supreme 
Court found that a state could not criminalize private, consensual 
homosexual conduct, even though historically, non-procreative sexual 
activity was often criminalized.77  The Court in Lawrence noted that “our 
laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education.”78  The Court reasoned that, examining the 
“laws and traditions in the past half century,” there is “an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in 
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to 
sex.”79  The Court then concluded that private, consensual, homosexual 
conduct should likewise be protected by the liberty interest in the Due 
Process Clause.80 
Thus, the very specific right in question, private homosexual 
conduct, need not have been protected since the nation’s beginning in 
order to be protected as a fundamental liberty interest under the Due 
                                                 
71 See infra text accompanying notes 82–83 (discussing marriage as a fundamental right 
and explaining what that right encompasses). 
72 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal 
government, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the 
states, shall be referred to interchangeably here as they both contain the same liberty and 
equal protection protections.  See infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
73 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 
302 (1993)). 
74 Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
76 539 U.S. 558. 
77 Id. at 568–69, 578. 
78 Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 
(1992)). 
79 Id. at 571–72. 
80 Id. at 578. 
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Process Clause, so long as a more general right, freedom to “decid[e] 
how to conduct [one’s] private li[fe] in matters pertaining to sex,”81 has 
been developing in the nation’s laws and traditions. 
The right to marry has been found by the Supreme Court to be a 
fundamental right protected by the liberty interest of the Due Process 
Clause.82  This right includes the right to marry and to choose one’s 
marriage partner.83  Thus, though it did not explicitly say so, it is likely 
that the Supreme Court in Windsor reasoned that DOMA violated the 
liberty interest in the Due Process Clause because it infringed the 
fundamental right to marry by demeaning the valid choices of marriage 
partner made by same-sex couples.  This is so despite the fact that, like in 
Lawrence, the very specific right in question—in Lawrence, the right to 
engage in homosexual acts,84 and in Windsor, the right to have one’s 
same-sex marriage recognized85—has not been protected since the 
nation’s beginning.  Instead, the more general rights, the right to privacy 
in sex and the right to marry a person of one’s choosing, have been 
protected and are developing in the nation’s laws and traditions.86 
The Supreme Court found that the fundamental right to marry was 
implicated when it ruled that prison inmates have a right to marry,87 that 
people behind in child support obligations have a right to marry,88 and 
that interracial couples have a right to marry.89  This was so despite the 
fact that the specific rights in question—to marry when in prison, to 
marry while behind in child support obligations, and to marry a person 
of a different race—have not been protected since the nation’s beginning.  
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Windsor probably reasoned that when 
                                                 
81 Id. at 572. 
82 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (stating that the decision to marry is a 
fundamental right); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40, (1974) 
(“[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of marriage . . . is one of the liberties protected by 
the Due Process Clause . . . .”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967) (finding state 
prohibition on interracial marriage violated the Due Process Clause). 
83 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
84 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (recognizing protection for “adult persons in deciding 
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”); supra text accompanying 
notes 75–81 (discussing the Court’s decision and rationale in Lawrence). 
85 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682–83 (2013) (invalidating Section 3 of 
DOMA, “which excludes a same-sex partner from the definition of ‘spouse’ as that term is 
used in federal statutes”). 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 81–83 (discussing the general liberty rights the 
Court has recognized to choose one’s sexual and marriage partners). 
87 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 99 (holding that an almost complete ban on prisoners’ right to 
marry was unconstitutional). 
88 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375, 390–91 (1978) (finding that the statute 
limiting those behind in child support from marrying was unconstitutional). 
89 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
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same-sex couples sought to have their marriages recognized by the 
federal government, the fundamental right to marry was implicated, 
even though the specific right in question—federal recognition of same-
sex marriage—has not been protected since the nation’s beginning. 
Another possibility is that the Court simply found no rational basis 
for DOMA, and that in and of itself violated the liberty interest of the 
Fifth Amendment.  At times, the Supreme Court has found that the 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause protects a person 
from arbitrary government interference with a person’s liberty, even 
when that liberty interest is not fundamental.90  However, this doctrine 
has fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court in recent years, as it has 
been argued that it gives too much power to courts to invalidate 
legislation they do not agree with.91  Thus, it is more likely that the 
Supreme Court in Windsor simply reasoned that DOMA impermissibly 
infringed upon Windsor’s fundamental right to marry. 
E. The Supreme Court’s Findings on Equal Protection 
Windsor alleged that “DOMA violate[d] the [constitutional] 
guarantee of equal protection, as applied to the Federal Government 
through the Fifth Amendment.”92  She argued that DOMA, because it 
                                                 
90 See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–47 (1998) (expounding on the 
recognition that “[s]ince the time of our early explanations of due process, we have 
understood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary [government] action”); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) 
(noting that the liberty in the Due Process Clause has sometimes been interpreted to “bar 
statutory impositions even at relatively trivial levels when governmental restraints are 
undeniably irrational as unsupported by any imaginable rationale”); Lisa K. Parshall, 
Redefining Due Process Analysis:  Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and the Concept of Emergent 
Rights, 69 ALB. L. REV. 237, 237 (2005) (noting the traditional liberty due process test of 
classifying rights as fundamental or non-fundamental and applying a strict scrutiny or 
rational basis test accordingly). 
91 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the substantive due process protection for non-fundamental liberty interests 
has fallen into “disrepute”); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721–22 (explaining that requiring the 
presence of a “fundamental right” before determining whether the liberty element of due 
process has been violated “avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in 
every case”). 
92 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.  The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, includes the obligations 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the states.  
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (explaining that although the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution does not contain an Equal Protection Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause includes an equal protection component and holding that racial segregation 
in public schools violates the Fifth Amendment by denying due process of law). 
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discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, should be subject to 
heightened review under the equal protection guarantee.93 
Under current Supreme Court equal protection jurisprudence, there 
are three tiers of scrutiny that apply to laws allocating different rights 
among individuals.94  The most deferential level of scrutiny is “rational 
basis” scrutiny, which a challenged law can pass so long as it is 
“rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.”95 
The other two types of scrutiny, “intermediate scrutiny” and “strict 
scrutiny,” are collectively known as “heightened scrutiny.”96  
Heightened scrutiny applies to discrimination on the basis of 
characteristics that require special protection, such as sex, illegitimacy, 
race, national origin, and alienage.97  To pass heightened scrutiny, a law 
must either be substantially related to an important government 
interest—intermediate scrutiny98—or narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest—strict scrutiny.99  Although many courts have 
decided that laws that discriminate based on sexual orientation must 
pass heightened review,100 the Supreme Court thus far has used rational 
basis scrutiny to analyze sexual orientation discrimination.101 
                                                 
93 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
94 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that the Court “appl[ies] 
different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications,” and that “[b]etween the[] 
extremes of rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, 
which generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or 
illegitimacy”). 
95 Lyng v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 & n.8 (1988) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 
(1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 
U.S. 106, 107–08, 110 (1949) (upholding a New York traffic regulation because it was 
“relat[ed] to the purpose for which it [was] made”). 
96 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1315 n.4 (11th Cir. 2011). 
97 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996) (applying heightened 
scrutiny to classifications based on sex); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
227 (1995) (holding that racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 
U.S. 259, 264–65 (1978) (applying heightened scrutiny to a law that discriminated on the 
basis of illegitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny 
to a classification based on sex); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1964) (stating 
that classifications based on race are “subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’” (quoting 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 
640, 646 (1948) (applying heightened scrutiny to ancestry discrimination). 
98 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
99 Pena, 515 U.S. at 227. 
100 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181–82 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that 
“review of . . . DOMA requires heightened scrutiny” because, among other reasons, 
homosexuals as a group have historically endured discrimination and remain members of 
“a politically weakened minority”); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 
968, 989–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying heightened scrutiny to justifications proffered for 
DOMA); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) (stating that classifications 
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In Windsor, the Supreme Court did not discuss Windsor’s argument 
that sexual orientation discrimination should be subject to heightened 
review.  Instead the Court used the language of the lowest level of 
review, rational basis review, to find that DOMA violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.102  The Court found that 
DOMA is “invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and 
effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage 
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”103  Presumably 
because the Court found that DOMA could not pass rational basis 
review, it did not decide whether DOMA should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS 
Justice Ginsburg has criticized the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. 
Wade,104 opining that the Court should have declared unconstitutional 
the extreme Texas law at issue in the case, without going further “on that 
day.”105  She reasoned that by issuing a narrow decision, the Court 
would have avoided “displac[ing] virtually every state law then in 
force”106 and would have “reduce[d] rather than . . . fuel[ed] 
controversy,”107 by encouraging other branches of government to act in 
line with the Court’s decision.108  If Justice Ginsburg is correct that Roe 
went too far, Windsor was careful not to make the same mistake. 
Windsor invalidated Section 3 of DOMA, the statute at issue in the 
case, but went no further.  It explicitly limited its holding “to those [in] 
lawful marriages.”109  Thus, the laws of the more than thirty states that 
still prohibit same-sex marriage remained unchanged in Windsor’s 
immediate wake.110  However, the Windsor decision, by extensively 
                                                                                                             
based on sexual orientation must pass heightened review); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431–32, 476 (Conn. 2008) (holding that sexual orientation is a quasi-
suspect classification subject to heightened scrutiny); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 
(Iowa 2009) (“[L]egislative classifications based on sexual orientation must be examined 
under a heightened level of scrutiny . . . .”). 
101 E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 
(1996). 
102 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (invalidating DOMA as the 
government did not have a legitimate interest in enacting the statute). 
103 Id. 
104 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
105 Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1208. 
109 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
110 Supra text accompanying note 10. 
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discussing states’ historic power over marriage,111 by using laudatory 
language to describe New York’s extension of marriage to same-sex 
couples,112 and by condemning DOMA’s purpose and effect as 
“demean[ing],”113 encourages states that have not yet legalized same-sex 
marriage to do so soon, and gives a strong basis for invalidating state 
same-sex marriage bans to courts adjudicating such challenges. 
A. Applying Windsor to Future Same-Sex Marriage Cases 
A close reading of Windsor reveals that if a state does not heed the 
Supreme Court’s gentle nudge and legalize same-sex marriage, it may 
well be forced to do so in a future case before the Court, at least if the 
Court still contains the five Justices that joined the majority opinion in 
Windsor.114  Although in Windsor, the Supreme Court comprehensively 
discussed the states’ historic and traditional power to regulate marriage, 
it was careful to note that such power is “subject to constitutional 
guarantees.”115  States are held to the same liberty due process and equal 
protection requirements as the federal government, although it is the 
Fourteenth Amendment that applies to states and the Fifth Amendment 
that applies to the federal government.116 
                                                 
111 See supra Part III.B (exploring the Court’s federalism discussion). 
112 See supra Part III.A (explaining that the Court’s use of positive language indirectly 
praises those states, such as New York, that permit same-sex marriage). 
113 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–95. 
114 Id. at 2681 (indicating that the majority consisted of Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan); see id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In my opinion . . . the 
view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is indicated beyond 
mistaking by today’s opinion.”).  Four Justices in Windsor would have found DOMA 
constitutional.  Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion.  Id. at 2696 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and joined in part by Chief Justice 
Roberts, also authored a dissenting opinion.  Id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Further, 
Justice Alito, joined in part by Justice Thomas, composed a separate dissenting opinion.  Id. 
at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting) . 
115 Id. at 2692 (majority opinion). 
116 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citing 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975))); Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325–
26 (1903) (noting that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is, among other things, to 
afford citizens the same protection for their liberty as they receive under the Fifth 
Amendment); Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389, 391–92 (1901) (“The purpose of [the 
Fourteenth] Amendment is to extend to the citizens and residents of the states the same 
protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property, as is 
afforded by the 5th Amendment against similar legislation by Congress.”); Inmates of 
Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . imposes the same restraints on the 
states that the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes on the national 
government . . . .”). 
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Most of the criticisms the Court levied against DOMA would apply 
equally, or very similarly, to state same-sex marriage prohibitions.117  If 
DOMA’s principal purpose and effect is to demean same-sex couples in 
lawful marriages,118 it is hard to imagine a state same-sex marriage 
prohibition whose principal purpose and effect is not to demean same-
sex couples desiring to enter lawful marriages.  In Windsor, the Supreme 
Court found that the purpose and effect of DOMA was to treat same-sex 
marriages as “second-class marriages for purposes of federal law;”119 to 
“write[] inequality into the entire United States Code;”120 and to 
“identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them 
unequal.”121  It is hard to see how the Court would not also find that the 
purpose and effect of a state same-sex marriage prohibition is to treat 
same-sex relationships as “second-class,” to “write inequality” into state 
law, and to “identify a subset” of committed-couple relationships and 
“make them unequal.”122 
Just as the Windsor Court found that DOMA “humiliates tens of 
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples” and makes 
it “difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of 
their own family and its concord with other families in their community 
and in their daily lives,”123 a state same-sex marriage prohibition does 
the same.  Just as DOMA “prevents same-sex married couples from 
obtaining government healthcare benefits they would otherwise 
receive”124 and many other benefits,125 so too does a state same-sex 
marriage prohibition prevent same-sex couples from obtaining myriad 
benefits they would receive if they were permitted to marry under state 
law.126 
                                                 
117 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[h]ow easy it is, indeed 
how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion [on DOMA’s purpose and effect] with regard 
to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status”); see also Michael J. Klarman, 
Windsor and Brown:  Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 158 (2013) 
(recognizing that “it is hard to argue with [Scalia’s] claim that very little change to the 
Windsor opinion would be required to extend it to forbid state bans on same-sex 
marriage”). 
118 Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 2695. 
119 Id. at 2693–94. 
120 Id. at 2694. 
121 Id. 
122 See supra notes 119–21 (providing citations to the relevant portions of the Windsor 
opinion). 
123 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 2694–95. 
126 In addition to state benefits that same-sex couples may not be able to access without 
access to marriage, after Windsor, there are the hundreds of federal benefits only available 
to married same-sex couples.  See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036, 1039 (N.J. 
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B. Possible Bases to Distinguish Windsor in Future Same-Sex Marriage 
Cases 
The Court’s federalism discussion concluded that DOMA, by 
intruding on state power, was “‘[d]iscrimination[] of an unusual 
character’” that made an equal protection violation more likely.127  This 
is one line of reasoning that lower courts faced with a challenge to a state 
same-sex marriage prohibition could use to distinguish Windsor.  
Whereas in Windsor, the federal government intruded on traditional state 
power to define marriage, a state is exercising its traditional state power 
to define marriage when it prohibits same-sex marriage. 
However, the Court’s federalism discussion had no obvious bearing 
on its conclusion that DOMA violated the liberty interest protected by 
the Due Process Clause because it “demean[ed] those persons who are in 
a lawful same-sex marriage.”128  Thus, even if a future court finds that 
Windsor’s reasoning does not apply to an equal protection challenge to a 
state same-sex marriage prohibition, it will be harder for that court to 
distinguish Windsor’s reasoning to a due process challenge to the same 
prohibition. 
Nonetheless, it is likely that at least some state and federal courts 
will distinguish Windsor when deciding whether a state same-sex 
marriage prohibition is constitutional, as encouraged to do so by one 
dissenting Justice in Windsor.129  Courts could distinguish Windsor by 
                                                                                                             
2013) (noting that “civil-union partners in New Jersey today do not receive the same 
benefits as married same-sex couples when it comes to family and medical leave, Medicare, 
tax and immigration matters, military and veterans’ affairs, and other areas”). 
127 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).  See 
supra Part III.E for a discussion of the Court’s findings on equal protection. 
128 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.  See supra Part III.D for a discussion of the Court’s findings 
on due process. 
129 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (encouraging “[s]tate and lower 
federal courts [to] . . . distinguish away” when adjudicating challenges to state same-sex 
marriage prohibitions); see also id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the 
majority opinion “does not decide, the distinct question whether the States . . . may 
continue to utilize the traditional definition of marriage”); id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he question of same-sex marriage should be resolved primarily at the state level . . . .”).  
Note, however, that even if a court does distinguish Windsor in a future same-sex marriage 
case, it could still find that a state same-sex marriage prohibition is unconstitutional.  Cf. 
Catherine Jean Archibald, De-Clothing Sex-Based Classifications—Same-Sex Marriage Is Just the 
Beginning:  Achieving Formal Sex Equality in the Modern Era, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 5–13 (2009) 
(arguing that same-sex marriage prohibitions are a type of sex discrimination that should 
be judged with strict scrutiny).  See generally Catherine Jean Archibald, Two Wrongs Don’t 
Make a Right:  Implications of the Sex Discrimination Present in Same-Sex Marriage Exclusions for 
the Next Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Case, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (2013) (explaining 
how same-sex marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional because they constitute sex 
discrimination and cannot pass the heightened review applicable to such discrimination). 
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noting:  its extensive discussion on how states traditionally have the 
power to decide who can marry supports rather than detracts from a 
state’s decision to prohibit same-sex marriage; the Windsor Court 
specifically limited its holding to same-sex couples married under state 
law;130 and the history and text of DOMA is necessarily different from a 
state’s same-sex marriage prohibition because it is a different law.131 
However, many more courts facing future challenges to state same-
sex marriage prohibitions are likely to find that because Windsor held 
that DOMA’s purpose and effect violates the equal protection and due 
process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution, so too do state-law same-sex 
marriage prohibitions, as a growing number of lower courts have 
already found.132  The Supreme Court did not go so far as to say so in 
Windsor, probably in the hope of reducing rather than fueling 
controversy,133 and in the hope of encouraging more states to legalize 
same-sex marriage on their own initiative. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor is a seminal decision that 
gave hundreds of new rights to same-sex married couples.  However, the 
Windsor opinion limits its holding to “those in lawful marriages” and so 
has no immediate effect on the laws of the more than thirty states where 
same-sex marriage is still prohibited.  Nonetheless, this Article has 
shown that the opinion in Windsor paves the way for more same-sex 
couples to be able to marry in the future by:  encouraging more states to 
voluntarily extend marriage rights to same-sex couples; and making it 
more likely that courts in future cases will decide that state same-sex 
marriage prohibitions are unconstitutional. 
  
                                                 
130 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
131 See id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the “statute-specific 
considerations” discussed in the majority opinion “will . . . be irrelevant in future cases 
about different statutes”). 
132 See supra Part IV.A (discussing Windsor’s application in future same-sex marriage 
cases).  A growing number of courts have already used Windsor’s reasoning to find invalid 
state same-sex marriage prohibitions and other state laws.  See cases cited supra note 11 
(providing recent cases in which courts have relied on Windsor to find same-sex marriage 
prohibitions invalid in their respective jurisdictions). 
133 See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 1199 (explaining that to “reduce rather than to fuel 
controversy,” the Court should refrain from doing more than necessary to decide the 
constitutionality of a case). 
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